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This thesis examines the security requirements of
the software evolution model and identifies possible
security mechanisms called "control classes" that are
applicable to the model. Then, based on combinations of
"control classes," proposes a suitable security level
for each of the model's databases. Furthermore this
thesis deals with the possibility of using Pretty Good
Privacy as a method for protection of software data
stored in databases.
The software evolution model captures all the
necessary changes in requirements early during the
development process in order to help in minimization of
project cancellation, delivery delays and extra costs
for fixing errors. The protection of software data
against unauthorized accesses and modifications is a
primary consideration for the software evolution
process. In this way, we can develop a secure
environment on which the software evolution can rely
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Security is an important issue when dealing with
software development processes such as software evolution.
The primary goal of a software evolution model is to
capture all the necessary requirements for changes early
during the software development process. In this way, we
will succeed the minimization of:
a. Software projects cancellation due to requirements
misunders tanding
b. Delays on the deliveries of products
c. Total cost for fixing errors identified after the
delivery of the product.
In order for this model to accomplish its goals, we
need to make sure that only authorized users properly
manipulate all the software data. To succeed this
requirement, we have to consider establishing security
mechanisms, which will provide adequate protection of data.
Therefore, careful attention to security aspect is required
for ensuring a well-defined security policy.
The software evolution model involves a number of
different databases where software-related data is stored.
For that reason, this thesis mainly concentrates on
identifying the security needs of each database and
suggests some mechanisms that will provide control on the
users accessing the databases and the actions that they
perform on the data.
The databases could be part of a distributed system
that can be accessed locally or over a network. Thus, the
security of the software evolution model needs to address
protection of data while it is stored and while it is
transmitted over the network.
In this thesis we deal with the protection of data
while it is stored in the databases. First, we define four
"control classes" that are applicable for the protection of
databases. Then, we define four "security levels" as
combinations of the "control classes." Finally, for each
database, we propose a security level based on the control
classes that need to be used. Some other parameters such as
data accessibility, data classification and data
sensitivity are also taken into consideration.
Also, we exploited some of the features of PGP (Pretty
Good Privacy) version 5.0 considering it as a method for
encrypting data stored in a database. It turns out that
doing encryption by record instead of by field saves a lot
of space in the database.
Chapter II explains the necessity of security for the
software evolution process. It also explains briefly the
usefulness of software evolution and describes the software
evolution model. Chapter III provides some information on
security properties and presents some issues for data
storage. Chapter IV lists the security requirements and
contains the definitions for "control classes" and
"security levels." Chapter V presents a security policy for
each database of the software evolution model, suggesting
an appropriate security level . Chapter VI contains some
information about PGP, along with the results of the
experiments we did using the PGP version 5.0 for Windows
95. Finally Chapter VII summarizes this research and
presents recommendations for future work.

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY FOR A RELIABLE SOFTWARE
EVOLUTION MODEL
This chapter focuses on the importance of security for
an effective software evolution model, explains the need
for "software evolution" and describes the model.
A. IDENTIFYING THE WAY TOWARDS THE SOLUTION OF THE
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM
Many examples in the past have shown that the complete
determination and understanding of a customer's
requirements is very important for delivery of a product on
time. The software evolution model is a valuable tool for
software engineers to avoid delays and extra cost during
the development of a software product. This model allows
software-related data to be retrieved from data
repositories, modified according to software product needs
during development and saved back to the data repositories.
It is important to keep all the software data in reliable
databases so that no data is lost or modified by
unauthorized personnel.
Ensuring protection of these databases against inside
and outside intruders is the major purpose of this thesis.
Protection of data is a critical step towards the
completion of a reliable model on which software
development will rely for solving software problems
identified in the past.
A reliable and secure model will provide a reliable
method to the software-engineering world for improving
software development and maintenance efficacy, which would
yield millions, perhaps billions of dollars in savings.
In the past, poorly understood requirement
specifications have led to a 31% cancellation rate for
software development projects according to a 1994 Standish
Group survey [Ref . 1] . The same group reports that from a
sample of 6,516 IT application projects only 27% of
development projects were successful according to a survey
conducted in 1996. 40% of the projects failed and 33% were
late and over-budget
.
Software-engineers encountered these software
development problems because of the lack of a reliable tool
that can capture and handle the requirement changes before
the last phase of software life cycle.
By identifying the existing dangers to the model's
security and suggesting some security solutions, we will
provide the means for a steady and secure basis on which
the software evolution model will be built for solving the
frequent problem of software project failure.
Since the software evolution model and its security-
are not independent, we explain the software evolution
issue and introduce a simple version of the model before we
refer to the security issue of the model.
B. SOFTWARE EVOLUTION AND THE MODEL
1. Definition
Software evolution is a set of software-related
activities and relations between them that affect the state
of a software system. The difference with the older term
"maintenance" is that software evolution refers to system's
changes throughout the development of a software system
while the maintenance refers to changes made after the
initial development.
2. The Need for the Software Evolution Model
A look back to the past reveals many cases where
inadequate capabilities for software evolution led to the
failure of large projects. For example we could mention the
construction of the baggage handling system for the Denver
airport which cost $2 million for requirements changes
[Ref. 2] or the $83 billion that the US invested on failed
projects in FY 1995 [Ref. 1] . A well-constructed software
evolution model could help to reduce the waste of money on
software projects by overcoming the large backlog of
requested changes, long delays, failure to complete changes
and high error rates during the development of a software
project
.
Currently the development of huge software projects
makes it necessary to use a high level tool which could
handle the complexity of real software systems. This tool
needs to have advanced capabilities, so that it monitors
the dependencies between activities and records how a
change in an activity can affect the others, in which order
and at what level. Since a change or a series of changes in
the activities of complex software systems could result in
the redesign of critical parts of the envisioned system,
the tool should provide decision support based on the
interrelations between the system's activities. The
designer would then be able to identify in advance how the
envisioned system will be affected by limited or extended
changes due to redefined requirements.
The effectiveness of the tool is closely related to
complete understanding of software evolution. For this
reason the definition and implementation of a data model
that simulates the difficult and complex procedures of
software evolution would be very helpful
.
An abstract version of this model is presented in
[Ref. 3], [Ref. 4]. Salah Badr [Ref. 5] has done further
development of the model. A redefined concept of the
software evolution model is under research at the Naval
Postgraduate School, to approach more accurately the
procedures that take place during the development of
complicated, real time software projects and solve known
problems with previous models. From now on, this thesis
refers to this redefined model.
3 . Description of the Model
The software evolution model consists of a partially
ordered set of steps referring to the activities that take
place throughout the software development and maintenance.
A graphical representation of the model is shown on Figure
1.
After the designer has constructed a prototype based
on the initial customer requirements, a demonstration of
the prototype allows the customer to evaluate its behavior.
The customer compares demonstrated scenarios with the
expected behavior of the product and identifies any
problems
.
The prototype's demo results in a collection of
remarks, labeled "criticisms" in Figure 1. The origin of
'
From Prototype Demo
Figure 1. The Software Evolution Model
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these remarks are mainly the customer (s) who ordered the
product. Comments from other people affected by the
proposed system are useful and must be considered,
especially at the later phases and demos of the product
development
.
A project analysis group (usually a part of the whole
software development group) under the supervision of the
project manager discusses the gathered criticisms and
categorizes them according to what parts of the project
they address . The next action of the group is to raise some
new "issues" related to each category of criticisms.
The next step is very critical for the future progress
of the envisioned system toward its completion. The project
group examines thoroughly the raised "issues," in order to
decide if these "issues" create the need for new
"requirements" or modification of already existing ones.
The project group involved in this step of the software
evolution model is different than the group of people
involved in the previous two steps, and is always under the
co-ordination of the project manager. Project designers and
analysts are people whose technical support is helpful for
the evaluation of the gathered "issues." Their
11
participation and support in this requirements decision
step is absolutely necessary.
After the requirements have been determined, the
specifications for the new requirements must be created,
along with the necessary modifications of specifications
related to older requirements that have been changed.
The result is an updated set of specifications, which
are going to affect the design of the system. These changes
can be related to one or more parts of the original design
plan. The size of alterations that have to be accomplished
depends on how close the new requirements are to the old
requirements
.
After all the identified changes of specifications are
categorized according to the procedures they affect, their
implementation starts. This process is just before the very
important last step, which is construction of the new
prototype for further testing and demonstrations to the
customer.
The last step of the process, "Computer-aided Software
Evolution" is a complex process whose correct functionality
is one of the main ingredients that determine the final
acceptance of the product.
12
This phase cannot be considered as a stand-alone
process. It is the main brain of the model and the main
recipient of all the control signals coming from all the
previous phases as shown in Figure 1 by the dotted lines.
The outcome of the processes taken place here is to a high
degree directly or indirectly dependent on those activities
happening in the previous steps. So, a continuous
interchange of informative signals is necessary between
this phase and all the other ones. Some of the functions
that take place during this vital step are evaluation,
assignment, development, decomposition, documentation, and
merging [Ref . 6] . The explanation of these terms is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
The described model shown in Figure 1 contains six
databases, which intercommunicate with various steps of the
model. This is a two-way communication, which allows the
users to retrieve and update the data
.
There is a "hypertext database" which contains all the
data related to the first three steps. All the collected
criticisms, the raised issues and the derived requirements
are saved mainly as text files in this database for further
discussion and future reference. When data stored in this
database is required, it can be retrieved via cited unique
13
identifiers (alphanumeric symbols) or a search can be
conducted in the "hypertext database" using a keyword or a
set of keywords. This search returns the results, if there
are any, in categories according to the degree of
relationship to the search criteria. The functionality of
this database is determined by the fact that data related
to the first three steps of the model needs to be
manipulated often until the final version of the delivered
product
.
Trying to collect data from different sources and
organizing them for analysis, comparison and evaluation is
always more complicated and time consuming than retrieving
them from a common repository. So the existence of one
"hypertext database" serves the purposes of quick
manipulation of hypertext data and convenient review and
analysis
.
Another useful database is the "reusable component
database." The characteristic name of this database reveals
its functionality. Components of previously developed
software products are kept here ready to be used in future
products. These components can be used with no changes or
can be modified to meet the requirements of every new
developed product. The second case is what is happening
14
most of the time. This is not a problem since it is not
necessary for the project group to build new components
from the beginning for each new project. This depends
mainly on the similarity of the different requirements
between the various projects. But in the case of similar
requirements it saves money and time.
The "working revisions" database stores the temporal
changes done to the specifications and their
implementation. People working on specifications and their
implementation do many changes till they finally decide how
they want the specifications to look like and which is the
better way to implement them. This process needs a lot of
time to be completed, so there is a requirement that every
day changes are kept in a database for being reworked the
next day
.
The "design database" is the place where the final
form of specifications and their implementations are saved.
Furthermore it is the place where all the documentation
about the project and the source code (the actual software
versions) are stored. Some of the documents it contains are
the analysis report, the data flow diagram, and the module
description, the testing plan and the test results.
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The rest of the databases are interchanging data with
the last step of the model and each of these has its own
importance and functionality.
The contents of "personnel database" are not part of
the design of the system itself, but the information it
stores is critical for the security protection of the
model. Data kept in this database is related with the
people working for a project and could contain information
such as Name, Address, Classification Level, Social
Security Number, Tasks, and Database Access Privileges.
The "project management database" is managed
exclusively by project managers and stores data that
concern the projects that they lead. Schedules with
deadlines for each phase of the project, schedules for
tests or demos, and confidential information for personnel
involved in the project might be some of the data contained
in this database.
During the development of a software product it is
important to have handy all the tools that might need to be
used. The purpose of the "software tools database" is to
provide the means that will make the designing of the
product less time consuming and more efficient.
16
C. IS SECURITY A NECESSITY FOR THE MODEL?
The critical question that needs to be answered is the
following: "do we have to consider security requirements
for our model?" Since this question is very general, we
should think about the security aspects of functionally
vital parts of the model and whether they affect the answer
to the above question. There are many definitions of
"security," but the following is easy to understand.
"Security" is a set of procedures that must be
followed and a set of constraints that must be met in order
to assure that the data, whenever it is stored or in
transit over a network, preserves its privacy and
integrity. Data can be read, augmented, modified, or
deleted only by those who are authorized to do so.
Having in mind the software evolution model and the
definition of "security," let's try to focus on some facts
about the model
.
The data itself is very critical for the model to
function properly. Unauthorized modification of data can
lead to unexpected complications, delay to the delivery of
the final product and extra cost in terms of money and
manpower. So, it is evident that the protection of data is
of high importance and value.
17
There are so many people involved in the development
of a system, that it is difficult to monitor them all the
time. Attempts for disclosure of confidential data by
unauthorized personnel, or improper retrieval and
manipulation of data from authorized personnel are
activities that must be avoided using some access control
mechanisms
.
Another factor that should be considered is the
ability of persons not involved in the project, to access
critical data and retrieve it or modify it. This
possibility must be examined thoroughly, so that protection
mechanisms can be developed and applied to the model
.
In addition to these considerations we should also
consider the protection of data which is transferred over a
network. We need to make sure that the data arrives at its
intended destination and we need to have mechanisms that
verify its authenticity and integrity.
For all these reasons mentioned so far, we are
convinced that there is an imperative need to determine a
minimum set of security requirements which will help in the
determination of security rules. Based on these rules we
should recognize those security mechanisms and techniques
18
that better can be applied to protect the model against
harmful activities.
We will discuss some useful security issues before we





III. BACKGROUND ON SECURITY
A. PROPERTIES OF A SECURE SYSTEM
Different researchers have proposed various security
properties and used their own notation and formalism.
McLean in [Ref. 7] claims that properties of
confidentiality, integrity and availability can constitute
in a creation of a secure system. O'Halloran introducing
noninference in [Ref. 8] attempts to separate the low- level
activity from the high level activity. Noninterference
introduced by Goguen and Meseguer [Ref. 9], [Ref. 10]
captures the attractive notion that system security is
preserved whenever high level users are prevented from
influencing the behavior of low-level users. McLean in
[Ref. 7] also refers to separability as an example of
perfect security because it does not allow any interaction
between high level and low level events
.
Zakinthinos in [Ref. 11] talks about the Perfect
Security Property and defines it by indicating what
elements must be present in the low- level equivalent bunch
for a low-level observation. He also states that a system
satisfies a security property if and only if all the
21
low-level equivalent bunches satisfy the security property
predicate P.
Building a secure system is a difficult composite task
that is based on the designing of secure atomic components
.
Zakinthinos in [Ref. 11] identifies component independent
properties that allow a designer of a secure system to
interconnect components with a specific property and not be
concerned about the property not holding. He also refers to
component dependent properties that do not satisfy the
previous statement. For these components he presents
criteria that allow the system designer to know if the
composition will preserve the property or not.
B. DATABASE SECURITY
Castano, Fugini , Martella, Samarati in [Ref. 12] give
a simple definition for database. It is a collection of
permanent data managed by the Database Management System
software. According to them, databases must be reliable,
protect data and programs from unauthorized modifications
and disclosures and provide system continuity.
1. Storing the Data
There are two options for storing the data. One option
is having different databases based on the sensitivity of
the data they contain. The other option is having the same
22
database for all the data, no matter what the
classification of data is. The bigger the number of
classification the most difficult the data management. We
choose two levels, "high" and "low" for simplicity.
No matter which of the two options we choose, we need
to classify also the people using the databases. The
classification of people should be similar to the
classification of data stored in databases.
The basic architecture used in these databases is
shown on Figure 2. The "trusted filter" is the most
important component because it manages the data of
different classifications and passes labeled data to the
DBMS. Separation of data at different Security levels can
be achieved using one of the following techniques.
a. Physical. It separates spaces for data and computing
resources




Cryptographic . It uses separate keys to access data
at different levels.
d. Logical. It uses an algorithmic separation of data
within a shared resource.
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Based on the basic architecture, a number of variant
architectures have been developed, each one having its own
advantages and disadvantages. Their differences are related
TRUSTED
FILTERUSER DBMS DATA
Figure 2 . Basic Architecture for Databases




with the way different classified users are accessing
different classified data through different filters set-
ups. Filters could be completely separated (Figure 3),
interconnected (Figure 4) or fully integrated (Figure 5).
Also different classified data could be physically
separated (Figure 6) or sharing the same resource but
logically separated by a security kernel (Figure 7), or
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Figure 5. Database Architecture with Fully Integrated








Figure 6 . Database Architecture with Data Physical




























Figure 8. Database Architecture with Data Physically-
Separated and Synchronized From Ref.[13]
2. Access Controls
There are discretionary and mandatory access controls
which according to [Ref. 14] include not only the
mechanisms that are required to check whether a request
issued by a particular user is allowed or not, but also all
those mechanisms that are necessary to enforce the
corresponding decision. Access controls are imposed by
access rules, which are determined by the chosen security
policies. Figure 9 is a top-level access control system.
a. Discretionary Access Controls (DAC)
Each user (subject) who creates an object is
identified as the "owner" of it and usually he is the only
27
person that at his discretion can allow or disallow access
privileges regarding this object to other users. These















Figure 9. Access control system From Ref.[12]
b. Mandatory Access Controls (MAC)
In contrast with discretionary access controls,
only the security manager (who is not the system
administrator in highly trusted systems) is allowed to
grant or revoke access rights
.
MAC defines subject (users or programs running on
behalf of users) and object security classes. An object
classification defines how sensitive the information
contained in object is, while a subject classification is
28
related with the degree of trust that can be assigned to
that subject.
The combination of the two access control
policies would be the better selection for a well-protected
system. DAC seems to be weak in terms of losing control on
privilege propagation from the owner or other authorized
persons. MAC with subject and object security classes
overcomes this weakness and prevents information flow
towards objects of lower classification. Combining the two
policies, we succeed authorization control in addition to
access control.
3 . The Multilevel Database Concept
All data stored in such databases are required by
mandatory policies to be classified. This requirement is
accomplished by associating access classes with a relation
as a whole, with individual tuples (rows) in a relation,
with individual attributes (columns) in a relation, or with
individual elements (attribute values) in a relation.
The notation R (Ai, Ci, ...,An , Cn , TC) , is used in [Ref.
15] to declare a state-variant multilevel relation scheme.
Ai, i=l,2,... , n, is the attribute over some domain, Ci is a
classification attribute for Ai and could take any value
from a predefined access class set such as {unclassified,
29
confidential, secret, top secret} and TC is the
classification attribute of the tuple.
Entity integrity is a very critical property of
relational databases. The same property must be applied on
multilevel relational databases. For accomplishing entity
integrity the multilevel relation must satisfy the
following constraints:
a. The attributes forming the primary key must have the
same access class in any given tuple.
b. The access class for the primary key must be
dominated by the access classes of all other non-key
attributes in the tuple.
The problem with the multilevel databases is that we
might need to have simultaneous existence of multiple data
objects with the same name, where the multiple
instantiations are distinguished by their access classes.
This phenomenon is known as "polyinstantiation"
.
An attempt to try model polyinstantiated tuples and
elements was introduced in [Ref. 16], where the full
primary key is defined for a multilevel relational scheme.
This key is equivalent to a primary key in the relational
model, but now its apparent primary key, its key class, and
30
all classification attributes for remaining multilevel
attributes distinguish each tuple.
The concept of using security classifications in a
relation was the subject of many studies, which lead to the
implementation of different security models. The main
difference among the various models is how they deal with
the problem of polyinstantiation. More details of these
models can be found in [Ref . 12]
.
4. Encrypting Data for Storage
When a user encrypts and stores some data but then
cannot decrypt it, it is impossible to go back in time and
re-encrypt it. For this reason encryption applications for
data storage should have some mechanisms to prevent
unrecoverable errors from creeping into the ciphertext.
Schneir in [Ref. 17] reports the following problems with
encrypting computer data for storage:
a. A cryptanalyst can perform a plaintext attack to the
data that might also exist in a disk, or in another
computer, or on paper.
b. In database applications, pieces of data smaller
than the block size of most algorithms, it is
possible to cause the ciphertext to be considerably
larger than the plaintext
.
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c. The speed of I/O devices demands fast encryption and
decryption, and will probably require encryption
hardware. In some applications, special high-speed
algorithms may be required.
d. Keys are required to be safely stored, may be for
long periods.
e. Key management is much more complicated, because
different people need access to different files,
different portions of the same file, and so forth.
Encrypting each file with a separate key and then
encrypting the keys with another key known by the users
would be a solution to the problem of key management
.
Different users can have different subsets of the file-
encryption keys encrypted with their key. This method
allows multiple users to have different views of the
encrypted data.
There are two options when encrypting databases . One
is to encrypt the whole database and the second one is to
encrypt records. The first option is problematic and
inefficient since a user needs to decrypt the whole
database in order to access a single record. The second
option is more efficient for decryption but could be
susceptible to a block-replay kind of attack.
32
IV. REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY LEVELS FOR ACCOMPLISHING A
SECURE SOFTWARE EVOLUTION MODEL
In this chapter we determine the security requirements
for the software evolution and we define some security
levels being applied to the model's databases.
A. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SOFTWARE EVOLUTION MODEL
We need to identify the security purposes and criteria
we want in our model. Generally, we can express security
requirements as constraints on states we are allowed to
possess and constraints on transitions from one allowed
state to the other. To define the security requirements for
our model, we need to identify any constraints on the
model's state. These constraints could be considered
composite and expressed as the total of atomic constraints
applied to each of the databases [Ref . 18]
.
We categorize the security requirements that need to
be applied to the model in organizational and
administration, and operational.
I. Organizational and Administration Requirements
Security considerations must take into account any
software or hardware involved in data flow into and out of
the model's databases. In addition, we need to establish a
33
well-defined security policy, which provides guidance on
the following issues.
a. Protection Against Improper Access
Access control is the major issue for avoiding
unauthorized access to data related with the software
evolution model. The process of granting permission through
the access control must ensure that unauthorized users are
recognized and rejected while authorized users are allowed
to proceed. Depending on the desired level of protection,
we need to decide what access control mechanisms we will
use. They could be simple or complex such as the access
mechanisms applied to multilevel databases.
b. Integrity-
It concerns protection of software data against
unauthorized modification. It also includes protection
against viruses, errors, and failures that could damage the
data. Users expect to store some data in a repository, and
retrieve it unchangeable unless an authorized modification
has been conducted. The system should be able to inform the
user if any data was corrupted.
Another aspect of integrity we need to apply to
our model is related with the preservation of data
consistency during concurrent transactions or the
34
modification of data, which is enforced to take values
within an allowable range.
The issue of integrity is very important for the
model since any unauthorized modification of data such as
customer requirements could lead to a version of software
product that is far away from customer expectation. Thus, a
delay to the delivery of the product plus extra money will
be required for doing the necessary corrections.
Also, the data consistency allows the people
working for a software product to have the confidence that
the piece of information retrieving from a repository is
the latest updated data.
c. Confidentiality
This requirement prevents unauthorized disclosure
and thus constitutes integrity preservation.
For the model this requirement ensures that all
the information related with a recent or older version of
the software product is kept within the software
development group. Otherwise information flowing outside
could be used from another unauthorized party which could




Software data should be available any time a user
requests it. Denial of service should be avoided by using
mechanisms, which ensure system fault tolerance and
redundancy in data, hardware and software.
Furthermore, for better protection of data
related to software evolution model, the project manager
should assign the task of database administrator to a
trustworthy person whose duties and responsibilities should
be clearly stated in advance. Also, people involved should
be carefully selected and educated for security awareness.
2 . Operational Requirements
a. User Authentication
People involved in the process of a software
project should be identified as authorized users of the
system. This authorization could be limited to some data
stored in particular databases of the model. Usually
authentication is succeeded through an interactive process
between the user and the system.
b. Inference Control
This control is necessary for establishing a
secure model. It refers to information regarding data
obtained by indirect detection. A user infers information
36
that is not allowed to access by using some other
information that he is authorized to access.
Statistical information about the software data
of a project in addition to missing data (protected data
not allowed to be seen) in records returned from a
requested query could also constitute a dangerous inference
channel
.
Two other aspects for model's security
requirements involve the need for auditing and data
recovery. Recording all the users' activities on the data
provides the flexibility of future analysis of access
sequences to the software data when a compromising of data
is monitored or reported. Also, it is desired to define a
data recovery procedure which will be able to overcome a
fatal data loss.
B. INTRODUCING SECURITY LEVELS
The different types of data stored in the databases of
the software evolution model, its sensitivity along with
the dangers associated with the model and the resource
implications of various means of avoiding or minimizing
those dangers, implies the consideration of different
security levels. These are related with the number of
different security steps that a user must go through for
37
accessing the data and the complexity of security
mechanisms and access controls. The more the security steps
of the process accessing the data, the higher the security
level. The greater the complexity of the security technique
used for database protection, the higher the security
level
.
The following factors, are closely related with the
need for security levels:
a. Data accessibility: how often and how many users
access the data
b. Data sensitivity: how critical for the model is the
data we wish to protect or
c. Data and users classification: data is grouped in
categories based on how valuable the data is . Users
are grouped in categories according to the higher
classified category of data allowed to access.
We think that data accessible by a large number of
people needs to be protected at a higher degree than data
accessed only by a small group. The activities of small
numbers of users accessing a database can be easily
monitored and recorded. So, in this case we could
accomplish protection of data without composite security
techniques and small cost in terms of money.
In addition, if its users frequently access data, the
possibility of being compromised is greater than data
rarely used. So, if we know in advanced that data is
accessed on a rare periodic basis, for example only once a
month, then we can use a simple method for protecting it.
For better understanding of how data accessibility is
related with the requirement for security levels, we will
use two databases of our model as an example. On one hand,
only the project managers of the developed software are
allowed to access our project manager database. Therefore
for this database we do need consider neither different
classification levels for the data and its users nor
complicated access controls. Consequently, the required
security level for this database could include some
discretionary access control in addition to password and
login verification mechanisms.
On the other hand, "hypertext" database is accessible
by a large group of people (designers, analysts, project
managers) with different tasks and responsibilities. For
this database it would be appropriate to establish some
type of classification of data and its users so that all
users can access data related only to their classification.
In this way classification controllers confine the
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activities of the user on the databases and we ensure
better monitoring and protection of the data. People
interacting with this database can manipulate only some of
the data which is required to perform their tasks . The
security mechanisms are more complicated and cost more
money for implementation. So, in this case the security
level should be higher than that applied to project manager
database.
The degree of data sensitivity would be also related
to the determination of different security levels. The
"reusable components" or the "design" databases contain
very critical information for the whole process of software
evolution. Any lost or unauthorized modification of data
could be disastrous for the developed system. Therefore, it
would be highly recommended a well designed security method
for protection of the data stored in these databases. It is
obvious, that in this case the required security level will
be accomplished by applying more restrictions and more
controls than those for "personnel" database where loss of
a record for example can not affect the progress of a
project
.
Of course, most of the times the realistic case we
meet is a combination of the factors we are referring to in
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this section. For example, data sensitivity plus frequent
data accessibility could both apply to the reusable
component database. A compromising of a password for
accessing this database would be a disaster if the only
protection were a login and password control mechanism.
Certainly, we do not want this to happen. Consequently, we
have to enforce highly secure methods to avoid undesired
circumstances, which may be not applicable or necessary for
the other databases of the model
.
To conclude, different security requirements for each
database along with the different characteristics of data
it stores, lead us to the need of introducing security
levels, which will be used as a basis for differentiating
the security mechanisms applied to databases.
C. CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY LEVELS
In order to formulate the different security
requirements of databases, first we will define four
"control classes." They are atomic security mechanisms that
either can stand-alone or combine between them in order to
establish an overall security policy. Sets of these control
classes will be used for the definition of four different
levels of security, each one characterized by a number. We
will name these levels as security level 0, 1, 2, and 3.
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The decision for the security level of each database will
result from considerations related with the quantity (how
many) and the identification of the proper control classes
that provide adequate protection of data. Some other
factors as data accessibility or data classification are
also taken into consideration.
1. Defining Security Control Classes
All users requesting to access any of the databases
are required to pass through a number of "control classes."
The number of "control classes" is different for each
database depending on its characteristics. We will try to
define "control classes" under a general framework for
secure databases, so that they are applicable to any
database
.
a. Control class one: System requires from the user to
enter a login name and password, which are checked
against the information saved in the system for the
particular user. In this control class, the security
mechanisms of the system perform identification and
authentication of a user. Security mechanisms can be
improved at this control class, by the use of
security add-on packages or security special-purpose
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hardware, which add new security features to the
system.
b. Control class two: A discretional security model
based on the DAC mechanisms, checks the access
privileges that a particular user has in order to
allow him to proceed to certain actions on the data.
Access privileges define a user-role based security
policy where the "role" declares to the system what
actions should allow the user to exercise in the
application. User's role is predefined in the
system.
c. Control class three: Users are required in this
control class to access the database via a
multilevel security model. A user depending on
his/her responsibility framework or in other words
his/her task(s) will get just the part of
information that he/she needs to perform his/her
task(s). Alternatively, access to data is governed
by classifications of subjects and objects in a
system. Mandatory access control (MAC) mechanisms
are used to enforce this security policy.
d. Control class four: Users are required to access the
database via a security model, which enforces the
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use of an encryption mechanism. These mechanisms
could include a wide range of encryption/decryption
algorithms from very simple to very complicated and
highly secure. User has to decrypt those views of
the data that are encrypted in order to reveal their
contents. Also he is enforced by the security policy
of the system to encrypt some or all of the entered
data.
2 . Definition of the Security Levels
We are using combination of the control classes for




SL is referring to systems where no protection is
required. Stored data is accessible by the public
and neither access control mechanism nor any
security technique is required for this level
.
Everybody can access and manipulate the data without
any restriction. None of the control classes we have
defined is applicable to this level.
b. SL 1 provides minimum protection to a system. Only
control class one is applicable to this level, which
forces a user to go through identification and
authentication procedures for retrieving the data.
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c.
SL 2 makes a system more difficult to be accessed by
unauthorized outsiders or insiders. A combination of
control classes one and two or one and three are
applicable to this level. This level provides
increased protection to a system and controls the
possibility of improper access from unauthorized
insiders or outsiders. Alternatively, for succeeding
high protection a combination of control classes
one, two and three or one, two and four could be
used where for the control class four an encryption
method using a small size key could be used to
protect the data integrity and secrecy.
d. SL 3 is the maximum protection that can be applied
to a system. A combination of control classes one,
two and four (using a larger in size
encryption/decryption key than that in SL 2) or one,
two, three and four are applicable to this level.
User identification mechanisms, trusty access
controls and highly secure encryption techniques
enforce all the users of the system to use their
authorization properly.
Table 1 shows all the security levels with the
applicable combinations of control classes for each one.
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The "X" declares that the control class of its row is
included in the definition of the security level of its
column.
SL SL 1 SL 2 SL 2 SL 2 SL 2 SL 3 SL 3
Control
class ONE X X X X X X X
Control
class TWO X X X X X
Control
class TREE X X X X
Control
class FOUR X X
Table 1. Security Levels Defined by Combined Control
Classes
D. IS THE HIGHEST SECURITY LEVEL THE BETTER SOLUTION FOR
THE SOFTWARE EVOLUTION MODEL?
The first thing coming in someone's mind would be
"what is the security level that we have to apply on the
model for better protection?" Of course, the answer does
not take a lot of thinking, "the highest possible level."
But the highest security level is not always feasible
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or sometimes it is not necessary. First we have to consider
some other parameters in order to select the right security
level. These parameters are related to the cost of
succeeding the desired security level, the complexity of
the security technique we will use, the desired speed of
accessing the data and finally the type of information we
need to protect. The classification of data is one of the
main factors, which determines the suitable security level
for a system. If the information is critical, the required
security level should be higher than the case where the
data is unclassified.
In addition to the parameters mentioned before, there
is another factor that might affect the choice of the
security level for a system, its users . Imagine a system
that is very secure, although the protected data are not
highly classified. The users of this system need to proceed
through a relatively big number of procedures in order to
access a piece of information. Such a system is difficult
to use and could not be easily acceptable by its users.
To conclude, we think that the selection of the
highest security level for a system is not always the right
decision. The system's preservation of efficiency,
flexibility and functionality could be a good feedback to
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our decision to keep or modify a selected security level
for a particular system.
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V. SECURITY POLICY AND TECHNIQUES
A. A SUCCINCT APPROACH TO THE SECURITY PROBLEM
What we have to face in our model case is a collection
of sensitive and insensitive data that must be manipulated
by people with different responsibilities who might not all
be trustworthy.
The key to the methodology of accessing while
protecting vital data and information should be first to
identify the users. Then we must define their rights and
establish their responsibilities . Everybody should follow
the security rules, without any exception [Ref. 19].
The approach we chose for satisfying the security
needs of the model is not unique. Since the software
evolution model consists of six different databases, the
security of the model resides mainly on the security of
these databases
.
B. MODEL'S SECURITY POLICY
In this section we establish a security policy for
each database of the software evolution model. The security
policy selection is related to the decision of how many and
which security control classes are required for the
protection of each database. We will discuss each database
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separately and identify its security needs. Finally, we
propose an appropriate security level for each database.
1 . Personnel Database
For the functionality and security of the model we
need to include in each person's record the following
pieces of information.
a. Task(s) : A person can work on more than one project
and also can have different task(s) for each
project. This information is needed, because as we
will see later on access control to some of the
databases is based on the task(s) of each individual
in the project.
b. Skill Level: This information, in case of a security
attack to the system, might be useful for the system
administrator to identify some possible suspects.
c
.
Database Access and Action Privileges : Each
individual should know in advance which database he
is allowed to access for manipulation of data.
Furthermore, it is desirable to specify for him a
set of privileges that are related with the actions,
which he can perform on the data stored in
databases. These pieces of information can be used
from the access control mechanisms of the databases
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to grant or deny permission to a user. So, it is
critical to ensure that the entered information for
each individual is protected from unauthorized
modification.
d. Login name, account number, and password. The system
uses them for identifying and authorizing each user
and allowing him to proceed. All the passwords must
be encrypted and kept in a different file (not as a
separate field in a person's record)
.
In addition to the above critical attributes we need
to identify the potential users of this database. Project
managers are mainly the people that need to manipulate the
data stored in "personnel" database. Project managers
should be able to read, write/modify, and execute data
related with "skill level" and "task(s)." Modifications of
these entries by people other than the project managers are
prohibited.
For the entries to "database access" and "action
privileges" fields we suggest two methods. The first allows
only the security administrator to assign for each
individual a "database access" and "action privileges" for
each database upon approval of the project manager. Project
managers only may read these entries. If there is a need
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for modification of these settings, they can request it to
the system administrator, the only person authorized to do
modifications to the values of "database access" and
"action privileges" attributes.
This method allows the system administrator to control
and monitor the users accessing the databases and their
transactions
.
The second method allows the project manager to do any
necessary modifications to the "database access" and
"action privileges" entries without a previous notification
to the system administrator. This option is more flexible
and avoids any delays because the same person (project
manager) processes any modifications resulting from changes
done to the task(s) entries.
In the case that the second method is chosen, every
time a change to "database access" and/or "action
privileges" fields is performed, a notification message
from the DBMS is forwarded to the system administrator.
Keeping the number of people allowed to access the
"personnel database" small implies fewer chances for
unauthorized users to disclose secret info such as "login"
name, "password" or pass phrase.
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For this reason, we suggest that we should not allow
individuals (except project managers) access to the
"personnel" database. Any change to "login" name or
"password" that individual needs to do, because he suspects
a compromise of them, should be through the system
administrator.
Any unauthorized modifications to the values of the
attributes we have discussed could lead to a series of
undesirable situations causing delays to the progress of
the software project. For example such modifications could
result in having unqualified people do specific tasks, or
assigning jobs to persons that were not supposed to deal
with, or people with low skill level be assigned to do
tasks, which require higher skill levels. Also, it could
result in having people retrieve data from databases that
are not allowed.
A security level 2, defined by access control
mechanisms as well as encryption to some of the data fields
of the personal records, could provide enough protection
against attempts for compromising data integrity. Secrecy
of data is not so critical as integrity since disclosure of
information kept in this database can not constitute a
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threat for the scope of software evolution model, since it
is difficult to affect the progress of a software project.
The security level we propose is based on a
combination of control classes two and four that a user
must go through every time he wants to manipulate some
data. Control class one must always be the first control
class that an individual has to successfully pass through
no matter what the security level is . The sequence of
control classes is shown on Figure 10.
a. The Process
A user enters his password and identification
name (login name) in order to pass the control class one
and proceed to the control class two, which includes the
access control mechanisms. He enters a query and DBMS
returns the corresponding records. The user, although he
has the records he needs, cannot read the values of data
that are encrypted. In order to be able to read the
encrypted fields he needs to successfully pass through
control class four. The encryption controller checks the
validity of information that is required from the user and
if there is a match with the respective information saved

















Figure 10 Sequence of Control Classes for Personnel
Database
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for reading. If a user needs to modify an encrypted
field/record, he has to decrypt it and then re-encrypt it.
Among different encryption techniques we
considered Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for the "personnel"
database. PGP is a well-known security software package
combining the speed of conventional single-key encryption
with the convenience and higher security of public key
cryptosystems . All the users of the database should have a
private key in addition to a public key. The public key is
available to everybody and is saved to a public ring. The
private key is kept secret and only the individual user of
the database knows it.
Furthermore, the system using the PGP "sign"
feature, forces the user to digitally sign any new entry or
modification he did in addition to the performed
encryption. This authentication scheme is needed especially
for transmitting data over a network.
We did some experiments using PGP and we found
out that encrypting by record rather than by field is more
effective since it requires less space for data storage.
Actually we found that increasing the number of fields the
PGP ratio is increased, meaning that encrypting by record
is even more efficient when the number of record fields is
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increased. More details on our experiments are included in
Chapter VI
.
Users can reentry at most three times the required
identification and authentication data. We believe that
this number is enough to handle some misspelling or typo
errors. The same number of attempts applies also to PGP
control mechanism. A larger number would allow an
unauthorized user to experiment a greater possibility of
guessing the required entry (login name, password or pass
phrase) . After the third attempt, the system locks and
sends a notification message to the system administrator.
A detailed graphical representation of security level
2 sequence of events is shown in Figure 11. A potential
"personnel" database is shown in Figure 12 while the
retrieval of data could be simulated as in Figure 13
.
2 . Hypertext Database
It is the place where all the criticisms, issues and
requirements are stored. Any loss or unauthorized
modification of them could lead to a version of the
software product that does not meet the customer
requirements and needs, and thus, it should be reconsidered
for improvement. This reconsideration implies extra cost in







































































User can request to
perform actions on
some or all of the data
depending on his role
Figure 11 Graphical Representation of Security Level
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The mechanism that controls which type of data a
particular user should view, checks the login name and then
tries to identify which task(s) are related with the
entered login name using the task(s) information saved in
"personnel" database. The system allows a user to access
and retrieve only those relations, which are related with
his predetermined task(s).
The actions a particular user can perform on data
stored in "hypertext" database are controlled by the action
privileges, which are kept in "personnel" database and set
by the system administrator with the co-ordination of the
project manager. "Databases access" relation of Figure 12
shows an example of how action privileges are set for the
whole database. But certainly, we can set different action
privileges for each of the criticisms, issues or
requirements relations of the "hypertext" database. These
settings must also be kept in "personnel" database.
Generally, we might have to consider that it is not
necessary to allow users of "hypertext" database to make
changes to the "criticisms," since we need to make sure
that they keep their originality. For the "issues" and
"requirements" we have to consider some modifications of
the already existing ones in addition to the newly created
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after the prototype demo. For this reason we need to
include the "write" action privilege in "issues" and
"requirements" relations of "hypertext" database.
Some other things that we have to consider for this
database is the large number of people accessing the
database and the frequency of access
.
Since clients will be able to run a prototype demo of
the software product from a remote location using a network
we need to consider the possibility that criti jisms will
arrive to the project group very frequently, maybe every
day or every hour. So updates of the "hypertext" database
need to be done very regularly. Consequently, may be it is
not efficient to wait for a number of criticisms to be
collected and then proceed to the procedure of raising
"issues" and creating "requirements."
Thus, the sequence criticisms-issues-requirements is
executed in a wide range of frequency repetition depending
on the project manager's policy. This means that a very
high frequency of transactions with the database cannot be
excluded.
A security level 2, defined by enforcing
identification and authorization control in addition to
multilevel access control mechanism implied by MAC security
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policy ensures data integrity. Confidentiality of stored
data is not of the same importance for this database since
disclosure of hypertext data could not affect the software
development process at the same degree with modification of
some data
.
The suggested security level is based on a combination
of control classes one, two and three. The user is required
to pass through the sequence of control classes shown on
Figure 14 to access the data.
The graphical representation shown on Figure 15
presents the sequence of events taken place every time a
user requests access to the hypertext data.
3 . Reusable Components Database
The components stored in this database are of high
importance for the software evolution procedure because
they can be reused as they stand or serve as a base for
building new ones. This provides great flexibility and
saves time and money. It saves time because we can retrieve
from the database ready to be used components in order to
build and implement our specifications. It saves money
because we do not need to assign people to build the
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Figure 15. Graphical Representation of Security Level 2
for Hypertext Database
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modifications might be enough for satisfying the current
needs
.
Because of the importance of these components we need
to make sure that people dealing with them are trustworthy
and take the necessary precautions for avoiding loss and
careless or improper manipulation of these components
.
Some of the components could be used for the
development of highly classified systems. Thus, it is also
very critical to preserve the secrecy of them.
For security purposes we need to classify the
components according to the severity of damages they can
cause if unauthorized people manage either to disclose or
modify them. In this case, it is essential to classify also
the users of the database according to the highest degree
of classified data they are allowed to access.
It is very difficult to investigate when an authorized
user made dishonest use of his authorization. But we can at
least prevent all the users from having access to the whole
data by assigning classification levels to them and the
stored data.
In addition to this, having an encryption/decryption
step on top of the classification control mechanism would
provide extra strength to the data protection. This way,
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even though someone can disguise himself as another person
with higher classification level, he would not be able to
view the data unless he has also compromised the secret key
needed to perform the decryption of data.
A security level 3 would provide the highest
protection against unauthorized transactions. This security
level is based on a combination of control classes one,
two, three and four. But enforcing this combination might
be very complicated and difficult for the users to adapt
it. Sometimes, complicated security systems are not easily
accepted by people and instead of providing the highest
protection, it turns out that they are vulnerable to
security attacks because their users disregard difficult to
implement practices
.
Thus, a second option which combines control classes
one, two and four might be more applicable to our model,
since it effectively provides data protection without
adding a lot of complexity to the system and consequently
it is easier usable by the people. Either the data is
stored or in transit over a network, a strong
encrypt ion/decryption method such as the PGP could ensure
that the properties of secure data are met
.
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The problem with using this combination is that if you
have no classification of data, a user having compromised
the necessary key, as soon as he decrypts the data, can
view it no matter what its classification.
So, users of this database should be trusted and
carefully selected. Also they need to be especially careful
with handling of encryption/decryption keys. For better
monitoring and control of their transactions we keep an
audit
.
A solution that could solve some of the problems is to
have the components categorized in "low" and "high"
sensitivity. Having encrypted only the "high" sensitivity
components and allowing only specific users to access them,
we could accomplish an effective control over the
activities performed on this database.
The sequence of control classes corresponding to the
second option we discussed is similar with that shown on
Figure 10.
For the process of accessing the data, the steps are
exactly the same with that appeared on Figure 11. The
important difference is the key size that encryption
mechanism uses for encryption/decryption. For this database
a longer key is required. For example, if we are referring
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to PGP, the use of a key with 2047 bits could result in a
highly protected system. The trade-off is that the process
will last considerably longer.
4 . Working Revisions Database
This database provides to its users the convenience of
saving data to a temporal location where it is easily
retrieved. It is important to ensure that the saved data
remains unmodified till the next time the owner of the data
decides to reuse it. This means that integrity of data is a
critical issue for this database and thus we need to use
security mechanisms for protecting it. Confidentiality of
data is not so important at this point since the
specifications and their implementation are not final.
The frequency of access to the database is high since
users need to store and retrieve their work many times per
day. The number of people accessing the database depends on
project needs and can vary according to the task(s)
assigned by the project manager.
A security level 2 defined by identification and
authorization procedures along with a discretionary access
control mechanism could provide adequate protection of
temporarily saved data. Thus control classes one and two
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are the least secure combination that we have to consider
and their sequence is shown on Figure 16.
The process of accessing this database is simple and
relatively quick compared to those we have seen so far to
other databases. A detailed step by step access procedure
is shown on Figure 17
.
5. Design Database
All the data kept in this database including source
code and implementation are very critical. So, the
preservation of data secrecy and the protection of data
integrity are the main issues for this database.
Sensitivity of data related with the various projects
can vary from "very low" to "very high." This sensitivity
variation creates the need for categorizing the data
according to its importance. Data that its disclosure can
not be dangerous at all or cannot cause undesirable
situations is categorized as "unclassified." All the other
data are considered "classified." For classified data, the
levels often considered are Top Secret (TS) , Secret (SC)
,
and Confidential (CF) . People (subjects) should also be
categorized to similar with data (objects) classification
levels. They are allowed to access objects that are
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Figure 17 . Graphical Representation of Security Level 2 for
"Working Revisions" Database
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In addition to classification levels we should use a
set of compartments, as they are known. This set is not
ordered as it happens to the classification levels which
can be considered elements of a hierarchically ordered set
where TS > SC > CF > UN.
The security policy, which enforces the classification
of subjects and objects is based on MAC security mechanisms
and uses the following principles formulated by Bell and
LaPadula [Ref 21]
:
a. Only read-downward. A subject is only allowed to
read objects if the access class (classification
level plus set of categories) of the subject
dominates their access class.
b. Only write-upwards. A subject is allowed only to
write to objects if their access class dominates the
access class of the subject.
For better understanding of how the classification
levels and the compartments are combined for accomplishing
secure multilevel access we will use an example. Assume
three clearances (classification levels) : Top Secret,
Confidential and Unclassified and a set of categories
consisted of two elements or "compartments." The
compartments are NATO and Nuclear.
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Figure 18 presents a graph whose circles represent
labels of "clearances" and "compartments." Arrows represent
allowable transitions . The circle where the arrow points at
is more secure than the circle from which the arrow starts.
A transition is allowed when the circle where the arrow
starts from has a label that satisfies the following:
Figure 18 Allowable Flow from a Least Secure Label to a
Higher Secure Label
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a. Its classification level is the same or dominated by
the classification level of the circle where the
arrow points at, and
b. Its compartment is the same or a subset of the
compartments of the circle that is pointed by the
arrow.
A subject (person) cannot do something to an object
(relation, tuple, file, application) unless an arrow or
sequence of arrows points from the subject circle to object
circle in the graph or unless the circles have same labels.
The Security Administrator assigns clearances and
compartments to each project team member according to his
task(s). These settings are kept in the personnel database.
They should be updated every time a person starts working
on a new project or stops working on an old one. If a
person is working on more than one project, which they have
a different classification level, then the system
administrator should assign to him the highest respective
classification levels.
Since the design database stores mainly the source code
and documentation for different versions of a software
product, we might consider that the need for "write" action
privilege should be prohibited for everybody.
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The number of people accessing the database is limited
and includes mainly the project managers and some
designers. The frequency of accessing the data is probably
low since most of the time this data is needed when a demo
is prepared or when a new version of a product is ready and
needs to be stored.
A combination of control classes one, two and three is
probably the better selection that satisfies the security
needs of this database. As a result, the security level 2
is proposed for acquiring an adequate protection of data
confidentiality and integrity.
The sequence of control classes that a user has to go
through is shown on Figure 19. Figure 2 presents a
detailed step by step procedure of security controls a user
experiences each time he wants to retrieve or store data in
the design database.
6. Software Base
This is a database frequently accessed by the project
members since it contains useful tools usable throughout
the development of a software project. Those tools should
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An identification and authorization procedure would be
enough for preventing unauthorized users to access the
data. But since any try for intentional damage of data from
authorized but untrustworthy users cannot be controlled
only using identification/authentication mechanisms, we
need to consider also some DAC limitations. For protection
of data integrity, "write" action is not allowed to anyone.
This does not create confinements on the process of
software evolution since the stored tools themselves have
no relation with newly developed data.
On the other hand, the unavailability of those tools
could have a practical impact on the progress of a software
project since they are necessary for some steps of the
evolution process. Therefore, we have to make sure that we
establish mechanisms, which are able to overcome any denial
of service. We can accomplish it by using some redundancy
in terms of software and hardware.
We believe that a security level 2 defined as a
combination of control classes one and two is appropriate
for preserving integrity and availability of tools.
The sequence of control classes and the access procedure
is the same with those presented for "working revisions"
database and shown on Figures 16 and 17 respectively.
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7. Project Management Database
The scope of this database is to help the project
managers to maintain pieces of information such as
scheduled deadlines for assigned task(s), scheduled jobs,
maintenance and meetings, future demos (when, where,
participants) and proposed test plans.
Thus, any loss or improper modification of data is not
going to affect dramatically the evolution process. Of
course, if for example there is an unauthorized change in
deadlines of specific task(s), that may cause some delays
if the change remains unnoticeable to the project manager.
Again, this is controllable and sooner or later the project
manager will realize any suspicious changes.
In addition to project managers, may be some designers
need also to maintain their data in project management
database.
Generally the total number of people that need to have
access to this database is limited. The frequency of
accessing the database is high.
A data disclosure or modification cannot create
serious threats for the smooth continuity of evolution
process. It might cause some temporal delays but it is
difficult to affect the delivery of the product. Lack of
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availability should not be a problem since some temporal
arrangements can give solutions to such cases
.
Therefore, there is no need for data protection more
than security level 1, which uses only an identification
and authentication procedure (control class one) . Figures
21 and 22 show the control classes and the access procedure
steps respectively.
If we need to consider a higher protection of this
database the highest security level that we should suggest
is 2, which adds some control on the allowable actions
performed by the users . In this case the sequence of
control classes would be as in Figure 16 and the access
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VI. ENCRYPTION USING PGP
This chapter provides some basic pieces of information
on how Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) works and presents the
results of some tests we did using the freeware version 5.0
of PGP for Windows 95. It also contains some discussion on
the vulnerabilities of PGP.
A. HOW PGP WORKS
PGP uses IDEA [Ref. 17] for data encryption, RSA [Ref.
17] for key management and digital signatures and MD5 [Ref.
17] as a one-way hash function. PGP's random public keys
use a probabilistic primality tester, and get their initial
seeds from measuring the keystroke timing and the actual
keys struck of the user. It generates random IDEA keys
using an algorithm, which is based on the one specified in
ANSI X9.17 [Ref. 17] with IDEA instead of DES as the
symmetric algorithm. A hashed pass phrase instead of a
password is used for encryption of user's private key.
The actual operation of PPG consists of five services:
authentication, confidentiality, compression, e-mail
compatibility, and segmentation. Table 2 presents a brief










































































































































































The idea introduced here is to use the PGP for storing
data in a database. In this way we can achieve privacy of
data critical for the development of a software product and
also enforce authentication of people manipulating the data.
For being able to say if this idea would work for our model,
we did some experiments using the Freeware Version of PGP
5.0 available from M.I.T site [Ref. 22].
For our test purposes we used a potential "personnel"
database from the software evolution model. This database
consists of 10 records and we assumed that a number of six
fields (attributes) are the least required. Also for our
tests we used maximum 15 characters for the first name, 20
for the last name and 16 characters for the task. If we
represent the unclassified, confidential, secret and top-
secret clearances with the codes UN, CF, SC, TS respectively
we can use two characters for the field named "Security
level." For the social security number we considered a
standard length of 11 digits and characters while for the
salary we used 4 or 5 digits.
Having in mind that each character or digit needs a
byte to be stored, the numbers appeared in Table 3 are



































































































































































































































































































































the plaintext (not encrypted field) of our entries. After
each row with the black-colored numbers there is another one
with red-colored numbers, which are the respective
ciphertext (encrypted field) of the entries after using the
PGP. For all the tests we used PGP for encryption and
authentication, so from now on when we are talking about
encryption this term will include authentication as well.
The two last columns of the table show that encrypting
a whole record takes less space than encrypting each field
of the record separately. So, for our first record which is
32 bytes in size, a space of 679 bytes is required for
encrypting with PGP while a space of 3 895 bytes is necessary
for storing the same record encrypting each of its fields
separately.
We define it as "PGP ratio" the ratio of required space
between encryption by field and encryption by record. For a
total of 10 records we noticed that the "PGP ratio" is 5.62
meaning that it is required 5.6 times less storage space if
we use encryption by record. This ratio becomes considerably
bigger when we increase the number of fields in a record
from six to eight as shown in Table 4. In this case the PGP





































































































































































































































































































































































of a plaintext database (no encryption is performed) we
have an increase of 44.459% in the size of database if we
encrypt by field while there is only an increase of 6.13%
if we encrypt by record.
The results from Tables 3 and 4 are showing that it is
much better to encrypt the whole record using PGP since it
requires less storage space. The large number of fields
that might exist in the database is not a problem for
encrypting the whole record with PGP, since the more the
fields of the record are, the more we save in storage
space.
Continuing we describe some other tests we did with
PGP. For different sizes of plaintext we measured the
respective sizes of ciphertext and the time needed for
completing the encryption. Table 5 has different sizes of
plaintext records up to 1240000 bytes, which in our opinion
is a representative upper bound for data (mostly text type
entries) stored in databases of software evolution model.
The other two columns give the size of the record after the
encryption along with the required for the encryption time.
Figure 23 shows a graphical representation of Table 5.
We noticed that the time for the encryption remains



















Table 5 . Encrypting Different Sizes of Records with PGP
This is important especially when you are dealing with huge
records since it does not take much time to complete an
encryption.
It is useful to have a closer look at the ciphertext
sizes and see how they vary as the plaintext size is
increased. For this reason, we constructed Table 6 and its
graph as it is shown on Figure 24 (values up to 8000 bytes
or plaintext size) where some more details about ciphertext
size variation are appeared.
Assume that an intruder is trying to compromise a file
and knows that the file he is looking has a size between 50
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Table 6. Encryption Times (in sees) and Ciphertexts for
Various Record Sizes
not say just by monitoring the ciphertext sizes which ones
correspond to the range of plaintext sizes he is looking
for, since larger file does not mean necessarily larger
ciphertext if we are encrypting with PGP.
C. PGP VULNERABILITIES
In this section we discuss some security drawbacks
related with PGP.
a. Compromised pass phrase and secret key. Avoid making
your pass phrase a single word. An easy to remember
but hard to guess pass phrase can be easily
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or very obscure literary quotes. A pass phrase is so
much better than a password since it can not be
easily guessed.
b. Public key tampering. When you use someone's public
key make sure that it has not been tampered with. If
you need to keep a copy of your public and secret
key rings in a floppy disk for backup purposes, make
sure that it is placed in a safe location.
C. "Not quite deleted" files. Even if you overwrite the
plaintext data on the disk, it may still be possible
for a resourceful and determined attacker to recover
the data. Faint magnetic traces of the original data
remain on the disk after it has been overwritten.
You can overwrite the original plaintext file after
encryption by using the PGP -w option.
d. Viruses and Trojan Horses. A specially-tailored
hostile computer virus or worm that might infect PGP
could be designed to capture your pass phrase or
secret key or deciphered messages and covertly write
the captured information to a file or send it
through a network to the virus ' s owner . PGP has no
defenses against viruses, so you must make sure that
his computer environment is virus- free. Also, try to
get PGP from a reliable source in order to avoid a
Trojan Horse version of PGP, which behaves like PGP
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in most respects but does not work the way it's
supposed to
.
e. Tempest attacks. This involves a remote detection of
the electromagnetic signals from your computer. It
could compromise all of your passwords, messages,
etc. The technology used for protection against this
attack is called "Tempest" and provides a shielding
for your computer system.
f
.
Exposure on multi-user systems. On such systems
there are greater risks of your plaintext or keys or
passwords being exposed. PGP cannot protect the data
while it is in plaintext form on a compromised
system. Nor can it prevent an intruder from using
sophisticated measures to read your secret key while
it is being used.
g. Traffic analysis. It is related with an attacker who
is trying to infer some useful information by
observing where the messages come from and where
they are going, the size of the messages and the
time of day the messages are sent. PGP alone cannot
provide protection against this attack.
h. Protecting against bogus timestamps. It involves
dishonest users creating bogus timestamps on their
own public key certificates and signatures. In other
words altering the date and time setting on his own
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system's clock, a dishonest user can generate his
own public key certificates and signatures appearing
to have been created at a different time. A solution
to this attack would be a trustworthy Certifying
Authority that could create notarized signatures
with a trustworthy timestamp.
i. Cryptanalysis . PGP is safe to use if your privacy is
not going to be violated by a determined and highly
resourceful attacker. Both RSA and IDEA algorithms
are secure and very difficult to be cracked unless
some vast supercomputer resources are used.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATIONS
In this thesis, security considerations, including
requirements and policies, for the software evolution model
was examined. Since the model consists of a number of
different databases with different needs for data
protection, each database was examined separately as a
component of a complex software system.
One critical fact about security is that no data
security system is perfectly impenetrable. In order to
decide which method is the proper one for a system, one has
to ask himself if the information he is trying to protect is
more valuable to his attacker than the cost of the attack.
This should lead him to protecting himself from the cheapest
attacks, while not worrying so much about the very expensive
attacks
.
Based on the functionality of each database, we
recommend that different security policies should be
applied. Thus, we defined some Control Classes as the means
that could be applied to databases for providing data
protection against unauthorized activities. Sets of these
Control Classes were used for defining "Security Levels"
which reflects the security policy that should be considered
for each database. The selected security policy should
provide adequate protection to the stored data without
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making the operation of the database very complicated and
inflexible.
In this research we deal with only the protection of
data while it is stored in a repository. The envisioned
scheme of the software evolution model where the users will
be able to send, receive and retrieve data using a wide area
network creates the need for addressing the network security
issue. Future work could concentrate on the protection of
data while in transit over a network. Furthermore, it would
be productive if in the future we could select some
different known security models that can meet the criteria
for Security Levels we defined and see how they work on
actual databases
.
In addition to the determination of a Security Level
for each database, we did some experiments using PGP for
encrypting records. The results are useful for further
consideration on how to use PGP for protecting databases.
For better documentation on the PGP issue, we believe
that more detailed experiments should be done using
computers with increased capabilities. Use of the PGP on an
actual database in the future would be helpful for
extracting more concrete conclusions.
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